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The Naval Practices of Belligerents in World
War II:
Legal Criteria and Developments

T

here was a continuity manifested between naval practices during the First
World War and the second one. The continuity may appear to be
surprising because the period 1914-1918 was governed ahnost exclusively by
customary law, while the period 1939-1945 was also governed by treaty law.
Before considering the naval practices of belligerents in World War II, it is
essential to examine the international law concerning such practices, including
naval targeting, which was developed between the World Wars. The subsequent
war crimes trials further developed the law applicable to those practices.

I. A Summary of Naval Practices in the First World War
Enemy warships remained lawful objects of attack without warning during
the period 1914-1918 as they have always been historically up to the present
time. Because of the functional equivalency with warships of those merchant
ships which participated in the naval war effort of a belligerent by, inter alia,
sailing in naval convoys or operating under orders to attack submarines, it would
appear to be logically required that they also be lawful objects of attack without
warning. This view was advanced by Germany as the preeminent submarine
naval power. From the German perspective, the proclamation of large submarine operational areas in the Atlantic Ocean where "unrestricted submarine
warfare" was conducted provided adequate notice to neutrals to keep their
merchant ships out of the proscribed areas. In a functional sense, Germany was
conducting a similar comprehensive method of economic warfare to the
"long-distance blockade" conducted by the Allied naval powers except that the
German technique was enforced by submarines rather than by surface warships.1
There is no reason to believe that gunfire by surface warships, the ultimate
sanction of the long-distance blockade, was more humanitarian than torpedoes
fired by submarines.
The views just summarized, however logical, were decisively rejected by
Great Britain and the United States which claimed that the traditional procedures
of visit and search were still required of submarines. International conferences
between the World Wars provided the opportunity for them to advance their
claims in international law.
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II. Legal Developments Between the World Wars
During the Washington Naval Conference (1921-1922) Great Britain
proposed the abolition of the submarine and Lord Lee made it clear at the outset
that in doing so "the British Empire had no unworthy or selfish motives.,,2 He
continued in reference to the submarine:
It was a weapon ofmurder and piracy, involving the drowning ofnon-combatants.
It had been used to sink passenger ships, cargo ships, and even hospital ships.
Technically the submarine was so constructed that it could not be utilized to rescue
even women and children from sinking ships. That was why he hoped that the
conference would not give it a new lease of life. 3
The French, Italian, Japanese, and United States delegations joined with the
British in deploring the claimed inhumane and illegal use of submarines by
Germany but favored their retention. 4 Secretary ofState Charles Evans Hughes,
the chairman of the conference, read into the record the full report on
submarines which was prepared by the Advisory Committee of the United States
delegation. It contained the following:
The United States would never desire its navy to undertake unlimited submarine
warfare. In fact, the spirit offair play of the people would bring about the downfall
of the administration which attempted to sanction its use. s
During the drafting of the proposed submarine treaty, Senator Schanzer, the
head of the Italian delegation, thought that it would "be useful to give a clear
definition of merchant craft. ,,6 Senator Elihu Root, a distinguished former
Secretary of State of the United States and a senior member of the U.S.
delegation, responded:
Throughout all the long history of international law no term had been better
understood than the term "a merchant ship." It could not be made clearer by the
addition of definitions which would only serve to weaken and confuse it. 7
No clarification was provided and the ambiguity remained.
Senator Root proposed in Article I of the draft treaty concerning submarines
certain rules of naval warfare, which were stated to be "an established part of
international law. " These rules provided visit and search of merchant vessels by
submarines as well as by surface warships. Article I further provided:
Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt from the universal
rules above stated; and if a submarine cannot capture a merchant vessel in
conformity with these rules the existing law of nations requires it to desist from
attack and from capture and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested.8

Mallison

89

Article III stated the necessity for enforcement of the above rules and provided
that:
any person in the service of any ... [power] who shall violate any of ... [these
rules], whether or not such person is under orders of a governmental superior,
shall be deemed to have violated the laws of war, and shall be liable to trial and
punishment as if for an act of piracy.9

The quoted provisions never became effective in spite ofthe support of the other
participants in the Washington Conference because initially France and then the
others refused to ratify the draft treaty.
Another attempt to draft rules concerning naval targeting was made in 1930.
Article 22 of the London Naval Treatyl0 of that year specified the law applicable
to both surface and submarine warships. This treaty was terminated in 1936
except for Article 22 which was continued in effect "without limitation of time"
as the Proces- Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare (1936).11 It
provides:
The following are accepted as established rules ofInternational Law:
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the
rules ofInternational Law to which surface vessels are subject.
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly
summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface
vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant
vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of
safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless
the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather
conditions, by the proximity ofland, or the presence of another vessel which is
. a pOSItion
.. to tak e them on boar.
d 12
In

The interpretation and application of these binding rules oflaw was left to the
belligerent practices of the Second World War and its juridical aftermath
including the war crimes trials "and the teachings of the most highly qualified"
scholars and publicists, to use the wording of the Statute of the International
Court ofJusticeY

III. Continuation of Naval Practices in the Second World War
Writing at the beginning of the Second World War, Professor H. A. Smith,
a frequent lecturer at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, pointed out the
dramatic differences between trading practices at the time of the Declaration of
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Paris14 (the first multilateral convention on the law of naval warfare) in 1856
and those in 1939:
Ifwe are again confronted with the facts for which the Declaration laid down the
law, then that law must be applied to those facts. That is to say, ifwe can discover
a genuine enemy private merchant carrying on his own trade in his own way for
his own profit, then we must admit that his non-contraband goods carried in
neutral ships are immune from capture at sea. Under the conditions of the modem
socialistic world, such a person is not easily to be found .... Today he has become
a disciplined individual mobilised in the vast military organization of the
totalitarian state. 15
At the start of the Second World War, the naval belligerents on both sides
continued the practices which had been started in the First World War and made
every effort to improve upon them. Great Britain had such complete control of
the surface of the oceans that it was able to force neutral merchant ships to
participate in the Allied war effort. Ms. Behrens, writing in the official British
history of the Merchant Navy, described the intensification of the system in
1940:
In the summer of 1940, the ship warrant scheme was launched, both to further
the purposes of economic warfare and in order to force neutral ships into British
service or into trades elsewhere that were held to be essential. No ship, it was
ordained . . . was to be allowed any facilities in any port of the British
Commonwealth unless the British had furnished her with a warrant. 16
Throughout the Second World War the United States, first as a neutral and
then as a belligerent, cooperated fully with the British methods. 1? As a matter
of theory, neutral states did not have to cooperate with the Allied naval powers,
but they realized that failure to cooperate would result in the application of much
more stringent economic warfare measures against them. The result of this
integration of neutral merchant ships into the Allied war effort is that they
became lawful objects of attack like similarly employed belligerent merchant
ships. Only those few neutral merchant ships engaged in genuine inter-neutral
trade were immune from attack.
The British Deftnse of Merchant Shipping Handbook (1938) was distributed to
the masters of the Merchant Navy in 1938. On the subject of "conditions under
which fire may be opened," it stated that ifthe enemy adopts a policy ofsinking
merchant ships without warning:
It will then be permissible to open fire on an enemy surface vessel, submarine or
aircraft, even before she has attacked or demanded surrender, if to do so will tend
to prevent her gaining a favourable position for attacking. 18
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Subsequent instructions stated that the enemy had adopted the policy of sinking
without warning.
At the outset of the Second WorId War, the German Navy incorporated the
Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare, also known as the
Protocol of 1936, into the German Prize Code which was distributed to
submarine commanders. 19 By October 17, 1939, Germany issued the order to
attack all enemy merchant ships without warning. 20 Thus, early in the conflict
submarines and merchant ships incorporated in the naval war effort were
attacking one another without warning. Germany declared that vast areas of the
North Atlantic Ocean were a submarine operational zone in which Germany
could assume no responsibility for either damage to ships or injury to personne1.21
On December 7, 1941, immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor,
the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations sent a secret message to the Commanderin-Chief, Pacific Fleet which stated: "EXECUTE AGAINST JAPAN UNRESTRICTED AIR AND SUBMARINE W ARFARE.,,22 Even though the
"unrestricted" warfare was directed against Japan, it could nevertheless present
a possible danger to neutral shipping in the vast Pacific Ocean areas. Because the
message was secret, it could not have provided notification to neutral states.
However, the almost complete absence of neutral shipping in the Pacific made
this problem more theoretical than real. The only significant shipping which the
Japanese treated as neutral consisted of Russian ships sailing across the North
Pacific between Siberian ports and Canadian and United States ports in the
Pacific Northwest. While the Soviet Union was a belligerent in the European
war, it remained technically neutral in the Pacific war until a few days before
the Japanese surrender.
Throughout the Pacific War, as in the Atlantic War, the merchant ships of
the naval belligerents and participating neutral merchant ships were fully
integrated into the naval war efforts. As a practical matter, such ships were
indistinguishable from formally commissioned naval auxiliary warships,23 and,
like warships, were lawfully subject to attack without warning. The United States
reversed its prior position advanced in the First W orId War and, along with
Japan and the other naval belligerents, recognized that such merchant ships were
functional warships and were subject to the same rules ofinternationallaw. The
United States has also reversed its position in domestic law by the enactment of
legislation which results in according to U.S. merchant mariners who served in
active theaters of war the benefits of veterans' status.24

IV. Post World War II War Crimes Trials

A. The Trial ofAdmiral Doenitz
The only war crimes trials conducted by international tribunals were those
before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the International
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Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo. The International Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg conducted the trial of the principal leaders of the former German
Government who were accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity. The
important case in which the Tribunal direcdy addressed the law of naval warfare
was that of Admidral Doenitz who initially commanded the German submarine
force and was subsequendy commander-in-chief of the navy. Admiral Doenitz
was charged with planning aggressive war (count one), conducting aggressive
war (count two), and with war crimes (count three) by "waging unrestricted
submarine warfare contrary to the Naval Protocol of 1936.,,25 Sir Hartley
Shawcross, the chief British prosecutor, stated to the Tribunal:
Nor need we take time to examine the astonishing proposition that the sinking
ofneutral shipping was legalized by the process of making a paper order excluding
such neutral ships not from some definite war zone over which Germany exercised
26
control but from vast areas of the seas.
The judgment of the Tribunal, after stating that it "is not prepared to hold
Doenitz guilty for his conduct of submarine warfare against British armed
merchant ships," continued:
However, the proclamation of operational zones and the sinking of neutral
merchant vessels which enter those zones presents a different question. This
practice was employed in the war of 1914-1918 by Germany and adopted in
retaliation by Great Britain. The Washington Conference of 1922, the London
Naval Agreement of 1930, and the Protocol of1936 were entered into with full
kowledge that such zones had been employed in the First World War. Yet the
Protocol made no exception for operational zones. The order ofDoenitz to sink
neutral ships without warning when found within these zones was, therefore, in
the opinion of the Tribunal, a violation of the Protoco1.27
The failure to mention operational zones in the Protocol of 1936 could, of
course, be equally consistent with the conclusion of their lawfulness. The
unreasonable and unworkable result of the holding is that the Tribunal accepts
the legality of German operational or exclusion zones as applied to belligerent
merchant vessels but regards the same zones as unlawful when applied to neutral
merchant vessels. In doing this, the Tribunal ignored the fact that in the Second
World War many neutral merchant vessels were sailing in the same naval
convoys with belligerent merchant vessels and the two were functionally
indistinguishable from one another.
The term "neutral merchant vessels" used by the Tribunal is more precise
than the wording concerning merchant vessels in the Protocol, but it remains
ambiguous and comprises at least two distinct categories: those engaged in
genuine inter-neutral trade which does not contribute to the economic warfare
resources ofa belligerent, and those neutral vessels which, through acquiescence
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or coercion, participate in the naval war effort ofa belligerent. The factual reality
was that there were no immune neutral merchant vessels in the Atlantic Ocean
proscribed areas. The Tribunal's invocation of the broad term, "neutral merchant vessels," enabled it to avoid facing the facts concerning the integration of
neutral shipping into the Allied naval war effort. The Tribunal applied the
Protocol to Doenitz as if it were a criminal statute. He was found innocent on
count one (planning aggressive war), guilty on count two (conducting aggressive
war), and guilty on count three (war crimes). However, the ten year sentence
imposed upon Doenitz was stated to not be based upon count three because the
United States also conducted "unrestricted submarine warfare" in the Pacific.
The result of this is that the sentence was based only on count two, according
to the Tribunal, which involved nothing more than Doenitz carrying out his
regularly assigned duties as a line officer. The principal criticism concerning the
Doenitz case, however, is properly directed at Sir Hartley Shawcross and the
other British prosecution lawyers. They either knew, or should have known in
the exercise of at least minimum standards of professional responsibility, the
factual reality of the integration of almost all neutral shipping into the Allied
naval war effort. 28 As it was, they permitted the Tribunal to make a determination ofguilt based on an erroneous factual assumption even though the Tribunal
stated that the sentence was not based on Doenitz carrying out unrestricted
submarine warfare.
In the Doenitz case the Tribunal also referred to the" LAconia order" and this
portion of the case is considered in the ensuing subsection because the order is
more directly involved in other cases.

B. Other War Crimes Trials
The war crimes trials other than the major trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo
took place before national military tribunals which applied the international law
of armed conflict. In addition to the trial of Admiral Doenitz, two other cases
were stated to involve the" lAconia order" issued by him on September 17, 1942
while he was serving as the commander of the German submarine force. This
order provided in English translation:
(1) No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members ofships sunk, and
this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in life boats, righting
capsized life boats and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the
rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.
(2) Orders for bringing in captains and chief engineers still apply.
(3) Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements would be of importance for
your boat.
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(4) Be harsh, having in mind that the enemr has no regard for women and children
in his bombing attacks on German cities. 2

The LAconia order immediately followed Admiral Doenitz' attempt to establish a rescue zone of immunity during the period September 12-16, 1942.
Captain Roskill has described the facts:
In September, 1942, a group of [four] U-boats and a "milch cow" (as the Germans
called their supply submarines) arrived south of the equator, and there on the 12th
U.1S6 sank the homeward-bound troop ship lAconia, which had 1,800 Italian
prisoners on board. On learning from survivors what he had done, Hartenstein,
the U-boat's captain, sent a series of messages en clair calling for help in the rescue
work and promising immunity to ships sent to the scene, provided that he himself
was not attacked.30
Admiral Doenitz ordered other V-boats to the rescue and the Vichy French
Government was asked to send help from Dakar. The U-boats then took the
principal role in the rescue operations which included towing lifeboats toward
the African coast. This, of course, diverted the submarines from their regular
wartime missions. Captain Roskill's account continues:
All went well until the next afternoon [September 16] when an American Army
aircraft from the newly established base on Ascension Island arrived, flew around
the surfaced U-boats for about an hour, and then attacked U.1S6 with bombs. It
is as impossible to justifY that act as it is difficult to explain why it was committed. 31
In 1960 the Historical Division of the U.S. Air Force stated concerning this
incident:
A summary of operations from Ascension Island states that on the morning of 16
September 1942 a B-24 of the US Army Air Forces sighted a submarine at 5
degrees South, 11 degrees 40 minutes West. The sub, which was towing two
lifeboats and was in the process of picking up two more, was displaying a white
flag with a red cross. The sub did not show any national flag when challenged by
the B-24. The plane left the scene and contacted Ascension. Since no friendly
subs were known to be in the area, the plane was instructed to attack.32
The officer who issued the order to attack and the aircraft commander who
carried it out were each prima facie guilty of a war crime. The conduct of the
aircraft commander is entirely inexcusable since he must have observed the
rescue operation. During the time that they are engaged in such an operation,
enemy ships are no longer lawful objects of attack. The fact that the U.S. Army
Air Forces took no action to investigate this incident and that no trials took place
under the then-effective domestic military code, the Articles of War, is a serious
reflection on the entire chain of military command. The attempt by Doenitz
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and Hartenstein to establish a rescue zone ofimmunity would have been effective
had it not been for the bombing. As it was, many of the personnel of the LAconia,
including Italian prisoners of war and British military dependents, were rescued
in an attempt which exemplifies the highest humanitarian traditions. The rescue
attempt was entirely consistent with the central objective of the law of armed
conflict to avoid unnecessary destruction of human values. In addition to the
destruction involved in frustrating the rescue attempt, the action of the U.S.
Army Air Forces resulted in the issuance of the LAconia order and the ensuing
uncounted deaths ofAllied seamen. Admiral Doenitz was charged with violating
the rescue provisions of the Protocol of 1936 by issuing the order. There is,
unfortunately, no evidence that the International Military Tribunal gave appropriate consideration to the rescue zone ofimmunity as indispensable context
for the LAconia order. The Tribunal did not find him guilty on this charge, but
it stated that the ambiguous terms of the order deserve the strongest censure.33
The second case, the Trial of Moehle34 before a British military tribunal,
involved a German U-boat flotilla commander who was charged with a wa!=
crime in reading the lAconia order to captains of U-boats in his flotilla and of
resolving the ambiguity in the order by providing examples in which the killing
of survivors was approved. In convicting the defendant, the Tribunal accepted
the contention of the prosecution that the examples used amounted to an order
to kill.
Although the third case, the Trial of Eck ("The Peleus Trial,,)35 is widely
regarded as an implementation of the LAconia order, it is significant that the
defense did not invoke it as a superior order which mandated the killing of
survivors. In this case, also before a British military tribunal, the captain, two
officers and a rating of the German submarine U-852 were charged with:
Committing a war crime in that you in the Atlantic Ocean on the night of13/14th
March, 1944, when captain and members of the crew ofUnterseeboot 852 which
had sunk the steamship Peleus in violation of the laws and usages of war were
concerned in the killing of members of the crew of the said steamship, Allied
36
nationals, by firing and throwing grenades at them.

The prosecution resolved the ambiguity in the charge by stating that the
defendants were not accused of sinking a merchant ship without warning, but
of killing its survivors. The Peleus was of Greek registration and under charter
to the British Ministry of War Transport. Following the sinking, the defendants
spent approximately five hours attacking the survivors and the floating wreckage
with machine gun fire and hand grenades. All of the survivors except three were
either killed or subsequendy died of wounds. The three were rescued about a
month later and recounted the grim events. The evidence indicated that the
captain, Eck, ordered the shooting and that the others carried out his orders.
The principal defense claim was that the actions were necessary to eliminate all
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traces of the sinking. An experienced U-boat commander, who was called on
behalf of the defense, testified that the approved method of evading Allied
anti-submarine attack following a sinking was to leave the scene at high speed.
All of the accused were found guilty and Eck and the other two officers were
condemned to death. 37
The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East states:
Inhumane, illegal warfare at sea was waged by the Japanese Navy in 1943 and
1944. Survivors of passengers and crews of torpedoed ships were murdered.38

The commander of the Japanese First Submarine Force at Truk issued an order
on March 20, 1943 which is translated and quoted by the Far East Tribunal:
All submarines shall act together in order to concentrate their attacks against enemy
convoys and shall totally destroy them. Do not stop with the sinking of enemy
ships and cargoes; at the same time, you will carry out the complete destruction
of the crews of the enemy's ships; ifpossible, seize part of the crew and endeavor
to secure information about the enemy.39

Several examples of the carrying out of this flagrandy unlawful order are referred
to in the judgment of the Tribunal. 4O One which is described in detail involved
the sinking of the United States flag Liberty-type merchant ship Jean Nicolet,
which had an armament manned by a U.S. Navy armed guard, and the brutal
murder of most of the survivors of the sinking.41 The Tribunal stated, inter alia,
that the ship's boats were smashed by gunfire and that some of the crew members,
with their hands tied behind their backs, had to run a gaundet on the deck
of the submarine before being forced into the water. The remainder of the
crew was left on the deck of the submarine when it submerged. Twenty-two
crew members who survived these grim events were rescued the next day
and provided the testimony upon which the Tribunal's findings of fact were
based.
In summary, the Moehle case involved an order to kill survivors and the Eck
case involved the killing of survivors. The judgment and proceedings of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East set forth facts which
demonstrated both the order to kill survivors and the execution of that order.
During the Second World War, aircraft attacked merchant vessels engaged
in a belligerent's war effort. No trials took place involving aircraft attacks. Ifsuch
trials had taken place, they should have been conducted under the same legal
criteria which would be properly applied in the trials concerning surface and
submarine warfare.
Captain Roskill, the official British Historian of the Naval War 1939-1945,
has written:
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It is £air to mention here that, with one conspicuous exception, the captains of
the Gennan disguised raiders conducted their operations, which were a perfecdy
42
legitimate fonn of warfare, with due regard to international law.

The exception referred to by Captain RoskiIl was the commander ofa surface
raider charged in the Trial if Von Ruchteschelf3 before a British military tribunal
with failure to give quarter during an attack on a British merchant ship. The
facts involved a daylight attack against the ship in which its wireless aerial was
destroyed with the raider's first salvo. The raider maintained heavy fire and
signaled that the ship attacked was not to use its radio. The case report states:
"The captain of the Davisian stopped his engines, hoisted an answering penant
and acknowledged the signal." The raider's gunfire continued, however, for
another fifteen minutes and wounded several crew members while they were
trying to abandon ship. Captain Von Ruchteschell was convicted on the
apparent basis that the ship attacked had given an unequivocal indication of
surrender. Mter this manifestation of surrender, the Davisian was no longer a
lawful object of attack.

v.

The Killings Following the Battle of the Bismark Sea

Unfortunately, it is not possible to state that only Germans and Japanese
murdered survivors of ships which had been attacked and sunk. In March, 1943
the Japanese attempted to move about seven thousand soldiers by ship from
Rabaul, New Britain where their military situation was increasingly precarious,
to reinforce the Japanese Army in Lae, New Guinea. 44 This involved the transit
of the Bismark Sea by a convoy of eight transports escorted by eight destroyers.
The U.S. Army Air Forces in the Pacific had had a poor record for accurately
targeting small islands, much less targeting moving ships, up to this time. The
new commander of the Fifth Air Force under General Douglas MacArthur, the
Commander-in-Chief Southwest Pacific, was Lieutenant General George C.
Kenney, who changed the situation by having his medium bombers practice
low-level attacks so that this capacity was added to the existing capability of
heavy bombers in high-level bombing. The result was apparent in the Battle of
the Bismark Sea where the B-25 and other medium bombers sank every
transport in the convoy (except one sunk by high-level heavy bombers) and half
of the destroyers. Once the ships were sunk, the U.S. Armed Forces followed
practices, much criticized when the offenders were German or Japanese, of
killing as many of the helpless survivors in the water as possible. Professor Samuel
Eliot Morison, the official historian of the U.S. Navy during the Second World
War, provides the following account:
Meanwhile planes and PTs went about the sickening business of killing survivors
in boats, rafts or wreckage. Fighters mercilessly strafed anything on the surface.
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On 5 March the two PTs which had sunk Oigawa Maru put out to rescue a
downed pilot and came on an enemy submarine receiving survivors from three
large landing craft. Torpedoes missed as the I-boat crash-dived. The PTs turned
their guns on, and hurled depth charges at the three boats-which, with over a
hundred men on board, sunk. It was a grisly task, but a military necessity since
Japanese soldiers do not surrender and, within swimming distance of shore, they
could not be allowed to land and join the Lae garrison.
Japanese submarines and destroyers saved 2,734 men from the convoy, but over
. . 45
,
were 1111ssmg.
3000
It is difficult to accept Professor Morison's facile statement that Japanese
soldiers do not surrender and his conclusion that a legitimate military necessity
was involved. Even ifsuch a military necessity had existed, it would not change
the substantive provision of the law ofarmed conflict which prohibits the killing
of survivors because considerations of military necessity, along with those of
humanity, have been taken into account in writing the law. Some members of
the Japanese armed forces, including the highly motivated Kamikaze pilots who
participated in the Phillipine and Okinawa operations, did surrender. It is not
credible thatJapanese soldiers who, it is assumed, could have made it to the New
Guinea shore would have become a military asset to the Japanese Army there.
The greater probability concerning a then-unknown future is that they would
have become an additional burden upon the supply and medical resources of
that army.46 Another historian, Professor Ronald H. Spector, has provided a
substantially similar factual account of the events following the Battle of the
Bismark Sea but has indicated skepticism concerning the claim of military
. 47
necesSIty.
If the ~ame legal standards applied to Germans andJapanese who killed helpless
survivors are followed in evaluating the actions of the u.S. Army Air Forces and
the u.S. Navy following the Battle of the Bismark Sea, there is no way they can
be described as other than in flagrant violation of customary and treaty law. It is
a serious reflection on the entire chain of command that there was no investigation and no charges were brought against those who issued the orders and carried
them out. Justice Robert H. Jackson, the chief United States prosecutor before
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, set forth the basic legal
principle in 1945:
Ifcertain acts in violation oftreaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United
States does them or whether Gennany does them, and we are not prepared to lay
down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing
48
to have invoked against us.
Hague Convention X for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the
Principles of the Geneva Convention (1907),49 a treaty of the United States, is
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applicable to the events following the Battle of the Bismark Sea and provides in
relevant part:
After each engagement, the two belligerents, so far as military interests permit,
shall take steps to look for the shipwrecked, sick, and wounded, and to protect
them, as well as the dead, against pillage and ill_treatment.5o
The limitation in the treaty concerning "military interests" refers to legitimate
military interests which are recognized as including lawful objects of attack and
therefore prohibiting attacks on survivors.

VI. The Protocol of 1936 in Context
The principal juridical basis on which the factual events of naval armed
conflict have been appraised is the Proces- Verbal Relating to the Rules of
Submarine Warfare,51 also known as the Protocol of 1936. There are inconsistent analyses concerning its interpretation and application to the events of the
Second World War. Professor Robert Tucker, writing in a Naval War College
"Blue Book", has stated concerning the Atlantic War:
Despite this reaffirmation of the traditional law in the 1936 London Protocol, the
record of belligerent measures with respect to enemy merchant vessels during
World War II fell far below the standards set in the preceding conflict. In the
Atlantic, Germany resorted to unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare against
British merchant vessels almost from the very start of hostilities....52
In the final stages ofthe conflict, the measures taken by Great Britain against enemy
shipping wherever encountered were only barely distinguishable from a policy of
unrestricted submarine warfare. 53
Professor Tucker has also commented on the legal situation in the Pacific War:
In the Pacific War no attempt was made by either of the naval belligerents to
observe the obligations laid down by the 1936 London Protocol. Immediately
upon the outbreak ofwar the United States initiated a policy of unrestricted aerial
and submarine warfare against Japanese merchant vessels, and consistently pursued
this policy throughout the course of hostilities. Japan, in turn, furnished no
evidence of a willingness to abide by the provisions of the Protocol .... 54
His interpretation of the Protocol provides adequate illustration of the fallacies
of the so-called "plain meaning" interpretation ofa "normatively ambiguous" legal
text. "Normatively ambiguous" refers to a legal term which purports to establish
a norm or category but is in fact so unclear that it requires interpretation in
relevant context rather than according to "plain meaning". The "plain meaning"
method involves these three sequential fallacies: (1) the "plain meaning" exists;
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(2) it is ascertainable; and (3) it controls interpretation without regard to relevant
contextual factors. Professor Tucker has apparently interpreted "merchant ships"
and "a merchant vessel" as stated in the 1936 Protocol as referring by "plain
meaning" to all such ships without regard to the integration of these ships into
the naval war effort. The result of the so-called "plain meaning" interpretation
here is to actually change the text so that the term "all merchant ships" is inserted
in lieu of "merchant ships." Ifinsertions are to be made in the text, it would be
more in keeping with the purposes of the Protocol to insert "genuine merchant
ships" or "merchant ships not participating in the armed conflict."
Professor Myres McDougal has emphasized the importance of contextual
interpretation and set forth its major features. 55 Applying this methodology to
the Protocol, it is necessary to consider the following: the pre-existing customary
law; the intention, ifany, to change it; the preparatory work including statements
of the drafters; the final text; the working interpretation given to the text by the
state-parties; and the principle of effectiveness.
The long-established customary law applicable to land, sea and air warfare is
that the exercise of belligerent functions always carries with it susceptibility to
being attacked. Application of this common-sense principle results in merchant
ships which perform belligerent functions being liable to the same treatment as
warships. This was established long before the W orId Wars in the era of sailing
ships. There is no indication in the records of the working papers leading to
Article 22 of the London Naval Treaty of1930 and in the reaffirmation of that
agreement in the Proces- Verbal of1936 of any intention to change the customary
law. The most significant statement recorded in the preparatory work is
contained in the Report of the Committee ofJurists of April 3, 1930 written by
the lawyers who drafted the text.
The Committee wish to place it on record that the expression "merchant vessel",
where it is employed in the Declaration, is not to be understood as including a
merchant vessel which is at the moment participating in hostilities in such a
manner as to cause her to lose her right to the immunities of a merchant vesse1. 56
This stated criteria is significant in that it demonstrates a clear purpose to make
a distinction between merchant ships based upon participation in the armed
conflict.
It is now crystal-clear that the terms "merchant vessel" or "merchant ships"
does not include all such ships. None of the state-parties to the treaty have
suggested any dissent from the criteria of the Committee ofJurists. Consequently,
the normatively ambiguous references to merchant ships which appear in the final
text are clarified by the undisputed statement of the drafters of the treaty.57 It is
highly significant in providing accurate interpretation that the naval belligerents,
the Germans and Japanese on one side and Great Britain and the United States
on the other, gave identical working interpretations to the treaty in spite of their
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highly divergent interpretations of most other major issues. The working
interpretation of the state-parties is of great importance, and this is particularly
true where it produces complete uniformity in interpreting the treaty.
Finally, the cardinal interpretative principle of effectiveness must be considered. This requires that any treaty must be given a practical meaning so that
it is succeptible of application in the real world. In the present situation, this
means that the agreement must be effective in actual naval armed conflict. It is
by applying its protections to only merchant vessels which are not participating
in the armed conflict that it is given a practical meaning. The contrary
interpretation based upon a supposed "plain meaning" would result in the treaty
becoming a nullity rather than effectuating its purpose ofproviding humanitarian
protections. A conclusion written several years ago is equally applicable now.
In summary, the juridical criteria to determine whether or not a merchant vessel
is participating in the war or hostilities in a way which results in losing "the
immunities of a merchant vessel" should be determined by the fact of such
participation and not by the particular method of participation.58
Hospital ships,59 cartel ships,6o coastal fishing boats and small boats engaged in
coastal trade61 are also immunized under international law from attack.
As reflected in the decisions of the war crimes trials which have been
examined, the central humanitarian purpose of the law is to protect human
values. Although it is clear under the Protocol of 1936 that merchant ships
participating in the naval armed con£lict may be sunk without warning, an
absolute standard of immunity from attack for the survivors of sunken ships is
required by international law. The ships that were sunk in the Battle of the
Bismark Sea were combatant warships (destroyers) and auxiliary warships
(transports) and the identical protection for survivors is applicable.
One of the post-World War II treaties, Geneva Convention II for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea (1949)62 specifies affirmative protections for survivors
of armed forces at sea including merchant marine seamen and the crews of civil
aircraft of the parties to the conflict. 63 Article 18(1) provides:
After each engagement, Parties to the conflict shall without delay take all possible
measures to search for and collect the shipwrecked, wounded and sick, to protect
them against pillage and ill-treatment and to ensure their adequate care, and to
search for the dead and prevent their being despoiled.
The significance of this provision is that it imposes affirmative duties in terms of
the protection of "shipwrecked, wounded and sick" and their care on a
non-discriminatory basis. Thus the post World War II treaty law enhances the
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legal standards of the customary law and treaty law developed by the post World
War II war crimes trials.
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